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Implementation of Congressional
Intent: A Study of Amnesty Policy
and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service

William Arp, III* and Sherrie L. Baver**

In 1990, the United States Border Patrol arrested approximately one
million illegals (Dillin, 1990). Significant as this number may seem, it
parallels the rate of arrest that existed prior to the passage of the
Immigration and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). This phenomenon suggests that the Act has failed to accomplish one of its primary objectives:
to control illegal immigration to the United States.
The IRCA represented the first major change in US immigration policy
in twenty-two years. In seeking to prevent illegal entry and to gain
control over the undocumented population already in the country, it
contained two key provisions. First, it sanctioned fines, prison terms, or
both, against employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens. The intent of
Congress was clear: to use employer sanctions to reduce the “pull” or
attractivenessof Americanjobs to aliens contemplating illegal entry into
the country.
Second, it granted “amnesty”, or temporary residence status, to all illegal
aliens who could prove that their residency began prior to 1 January
1982. Proof of residency required documentation and a general knowledge of the requirements for eligibility. Prior to the passage of IRCA,
the House Judiciary Committee (1 98 1) stated that amnesty would satisfy
the major goal sought especiallyby organized labour: “to remove illegal
population that adversely impacts the economic structure of American
society.” Thus, the US Congress soughtto protect thejobs of US citizens
by adjusting the residency status of persons who had resided illegally in
the United States for several years, and by removing the incentive for
employers to profit unduly fiom the practice of hiring undocumented
workers at lower wages.

* Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, USA.
**Departmentof Latin American and Hispanic Caribbean Studies, City College ofNew
York, USA.
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Colbert Rhodes’ study on amnesty (1 986) established a credible list of
problems associatedwith government attempts to deport undocumented
persons:

- lack of means for deportation of illegal aliens back to the country
of origin;

- massive deportation may appear inhumane to the rest of the
world;

- deportation may cause economic hardship for the receiving
country;

- cheap and tractable labour can be a desirable commodity; and
- political pressure from established ethnic groups within the country will seek adjustment of status for illegal co-ethnics through
legislation.

It is likely that the inclusion of amnesty within IRCA was designed to
counter the problems suggested by Rhodes while appeasing immigrants’
rights advocates, especially in the Hispanic community, who opposed
employer sanction features of the bill.

In general, amnesties are not policies particularly favoured by citizens,
and the 1986 amnesty faced strident challenges. Opponents of congressional consideration of amnesty argued that it would:

- take jobs away from blacks, Hispanics and youth;
- reward those who broke the law while denying foreign students
and temporary workers (who entered legally) the right to remain
in the country;
- deny government-subsidizedbenefits (e.g. medical assistance)to
illegal persons who had secured temporary residency status and
who were paying taxes; and
- create a demand for fraudulent documentation (The House Judiciary Subcommittee Report, 197 1-72).

Nevertheless, in order to satisfy labour interests, Congress included the
amnesty provision in the 1986 law and selected the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to operationalize IRCA and its major
components - employer sanctions and amnesty. The present study
targets the implementation process of IRCA as it impacted on amnesty
and seeks to address the general question, “Could INS implementation
have been more effective?” The more specific question is: “Did INS
regulatory interpretations of IRCA and subsequent procedures serve to
(a) exacerbatean already confusing programme and (b) distort the intent
of Congress?’
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IMPLEMENTATION THEORY
Implementation of a law is a process fiaught with obstacles. Successful
implementation of any policy can be measured only insofar as it corresponds to the “actual” intent of Congress. In this context, implementation
as a part of the policymaking process may be seen as a product of “intent
and action” (Rein and Rabinowitz, 1978). The actual implementation
of IRCA may therefore be seen as a process literally searching for
“balance” between written policy and the procedures that must be
developed to bring about desired results.
Theoretical policy explanations generally criticize either the vague and
ambiguous designsin the law made by legislatorsor the lack of resources
provided to INS as the implementing agency (Edwards, 1980; Nakamura
and Smallwood, 1980; Palumbo, 1988; 1994). But for implementationto
proceed effectively, implementors must not only have resources and the
ability to use them, they must also desire to carry out the policy mandate
(Sharkansky, 1970; Ingram and Mann. 1980). This study suggests that
INS as implementors did not favour the goals of IRCA and therefore
sought not to carry out the intentions of Congress by employing a
policymaking strategy known as “nondecisionmaking.”
Nondecisionmaking encompasses actions by individuals, groups and
even implementing agencies, that are intended to redefine, manipulate,
suffocate or kill agreed policy goals in order to negate their impact
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Di Nitto and Dye, 1987). According to
Frohock (1979), “the two key ingredientsof a nondecision are present if
reform fails: (1) the idea of what might have been, and (2) the explanation of the failure to reach it as the absence of needed decisions.” The
technique of nondecisionmaking is exercised by dominant groups such
as INS,who possess, control and manipulate vast economic resources. It
is also suggested by Frohock (1 979) that those who have the resources
and power can also obstruct reform “simply by doing nothing.”
As a powerful organization controlling vast resources, developing the
guidelines for amnesty eligibility, and as the sole implementor of IRCA,
INS possessed the ability to engage in nondecisionmaking activity
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). We suggest that INS may have ignored
known realities associated with illegal aliens and should have informed
and thus dictated the development of implementing guidelines and
requirements that would fulfil the legislative intent of the US Congress’
amnesty programme.
Our theoretical premise is that the intent of a legislativemeasure is often
transformed by implementation procedures utilized to define and acti-
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vate it within US society. The US government, via IRCA, sought to gain
control over the illegal population residing in the country by legalizing
the status of some through amnesty and forcing the ineligible residentsto
leave. Clearly, the US Congress was trying to serve two “Masters”: the
American labourer who wanted illegals thrown out of the country, and
conversely the owners of businesses who needed the cheap and tractable
labour provided by illegal residents. INS’ purpose was to implement the
preceding balanced objectives thereby satisfymg the legislated intent of
Congress.

METHODOLOGY
This study provides a structuralanalysis of the implementingprocedures
employed by INS and their attempt to implement congressional intent.
The roles of Qualified Designated Entities (QDEs) are explained and the
results of interviews completed with their directors in Arizona and New
York provide unique perspectives on IRCA’s implementation procedures. The Arizona and New York studies represent separate and
independent surveys which provide the perspective of illegal workers
regarding eligibility criteria used by INS to legalize their status. The
collective successes and difficulties experienced by illegal aliens also
provide data on the appropriateness and feasibility of INS implementation guidelines and procedures.
Community-basedorganizationsin Arizona and New York became INS
certified QDEs. These operated under a cooperative agreement with INS
to process illegal workers and their applications for legalization of
status. Generally, QDEs are considered trustworthy by the illegal resident population because they are well-established within the community
and offer assistance in a relatively risk-fkee environment.
Arizona study
In April 1988, we asked all 26 QDEs registered by INS in Arizona to
participate in a study which sought to measure the impact of IRCA. Nine
QDEs responded aflimatively but follow-ups with the others were
unsuccessful. Later contact with participating QDEs revealed that only
12 QDEs within Arizona remained functional towards the end of the
amnesty programme. During the first phase of the survey, data were
successfully solicited from 9 of the 12 QDEs still functioning.
QDEs are indigenous community organizations situated within Spanishspeaking localities in Maricopa County, Arizona. Historically,they have
sought to represent the economic and political interests of illegal aliens.
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Our questionnaire was designed to ascertain the perspectives of the
QDEs regarding amnesty and to discover those characteristics which
may have served to constrain, limit or promote the effectiveness of the
provision of amnesty within IRCA.
The second phase of the survey required collection of survey data fiom
the 308 illegal aliens who, as of June, 1988, still resided within Maricopa
County, even though the deadline for submitting applicationsfor regular
legalization of status had expired. This survey included both illegal
residents who failed to complete the application process for legalization
of their status and those whose applications had been rejected. Respondents were asked why they failed to come forward and complete the
application process to upgrade their residency status or why their
applications had been rejected. The surveys were conducted in Spanish
and English.
The third phase focused on Arizona residents who previously had been
undocumented residents, had completed the application process and
had received temporary legal residence. Data were collected fiom
286 temporary legal residents. The areas surveyed in phases two and
three were Phoenix, Glendale, Queen Creek, Chandler Heights and
Tolleson. Most respondents were located through the indigenous Latino
community organizations selected by INS as QDEs.
Individual-level data collected were subjected to a discriminant analysis.
Discrimination analysis, as the procedure is also known, identifies
boundaries between groups of objects. The analysispinpointed variables
which limited, constrained or prevented participation of illegal aliens in
the amnesty programme.

New York study
Data for the New York study were collected in two ways. First, information fiom the QDEs was collected between 1987 and 1989 through
participation-observation at meetings of the Mayor’s Immigration Advisory Committee and later at meetings of the Office of Immigrant
Affairs Advisory Committee. Second, a survey was conducted in the
Summer of 1989 involving 171 amnesty applicants attending INS
certified English and Civic classes.
Many of the questions replicated those fiom an earlier survey conducted
in New York for the INS in December 1987. Although the 1989 survey
covered only those who were successful applicants, it provided insights
into the problems shared by those who were successful and those who
were not.
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IMPLEMENTATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
Guidelines, resources and disposition of implementors
Implementation of IRCA was placed solely in the hands of INS; the
philosophy of implementation embraced by INS is articulated in Section
115 of the IRCA:
It is the sense of Congress that - (1) the immigration laws of the United
States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly, and (2) in the
enforcement of such laws, the Attorney General shall take due and
deliberate actions necessary to safeguard the constitutional rights, personal safety, and human dignity of United States citizens and aliens.

At the request of INS, Congress provided implementation phase-in
provisions for employer sanctions and amnesty. Prior to the development of specific guidelines, INS sought input from voluntary
organizations and others in the Washington area. Phase 1 of the implementing process included press conferences and meetings held by INS
district offices throughout the country. A questionnaire was utilized at
these meetings to solicit the advice of concerned groups and individuals
in the development of the agency’s public education efforts. The questions attempted to ascertain those parts of the amnesty programme that
may be confusing to applicants,the fears applicants may have regarding
the amnesty programme, and how INS could maximize turnout of
applicants. In phase 2, INS drafted regulations, issued contracts for
QDEs services and acquired equipment and materials for amnesty
offices. In phase 3, the proposed regulations were distributed to select
groups for their comments.
The law provided for temporary residency status for illegal aliens who
could prove that they had entered the United States before 1 January
1982, and had thereafter lived in the US continuously except for an
occasional short absence. Further requirements under the amnesty provision were:

- applications had to be made within a 12-monthperiod beginning
5 May 1987;

- the applicanthad not been convicted of a felony or more than three
misdemeanours;

- if eligible for amnesty, the applicant must register under the
Military Selective Service Act;

- the application fee must be paid;
- the applicant had not participated in acts which harmed others
because of their race, religion or nationality; and

- the applicant had undergone a medical examination.
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The deadline for applying for regular amnesty was 5 May 1988 and the
guidelines required extensive documentation to determine eligibility.
It was INS’ intention to be ready to accept applications for amnesty by
5 May 1987. A concerted effort was made to open more than 100
amnesty offices nationwide and to have QDEs in place to assist illegals
in the application process. Although community organizations assisted
INS to reach its goal on time, they and INS officials anticipated difficulties in the implementation of amnesty provisions because of the
historical enforcement role of INS, a role that had also fostered distrust
on the part of the very people that INS wanted to reach. It was therefore
important for INS to stress that the amnesty programme would not be
used as an enforcement tool or to locate illegal aliens.
Selected QDEs made a number of suggestions to INS prior to the
development of implementing guidelines for amnesty, including a
strong reunification programme for those family members who were
ineligible for legalization, lessening of documentation, lowering of fees
and elimination of the requirement to take medical examinations only
from “selected civil surgeons.”
This stage of the policy process provides very clear examples of nondecisionmaking. The procedures employed by INS supposedly had
sought to incorporate the views of groups, individuals and especially
INS-approved QDEs situatedwithin illegal residents’ communities. INS
had given the appearance of wanting to cooperate with groups representing illegal aliens by requesting their comments, suggestions and
recommendations regarding the establishment of eligibility guidelines
affecting the implementation of amnesty. However, the predetermined
implementation philosophy of INS seemed to exclude comments and
suggestions which could possibly threaten or potentially dilute the
articulated “intent of Congress” (Carrasco, 1989).

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS
OF QUALIFIED DESIGNATED ENTITIES (QDEs)
Latino community organizations(INS-appointed QDEs) were surveyed
to determine their degree of input during the implementation stages of
IRCA, their perspectives of the eligibility guidelines regulating legalization, and the variables or factors that they considered had served to limit
or constrain undocumented persons from participating in the legalization provision of IRCA.
Eight of the nine QDEs surveyedhad attempted to actively influence the
structure of the legalization provision. Some lobbied through their
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national offices and the Arizona congressional delegation to influence
the focus of the provision. Others participated in various legislative
hearings and locally networked with other immigration non-profit agencies via meetings and legislative feedback. Eight provided INS with
input and information regarding the proposed development of guidelines
and regulations, and the Arizona Immigration Steering Committee,
which included all QDEs in the State of Arizona, met regularly to draft
responses to INS proposed guidelines.

QDEs were unanimous in their view that the undocumented workers
failed to come forward because of the excessive documentation required, lack of strong family unification provisions,the financialcost for
those seeking to legalize their status, and fear of INS.QDEs identified
major flaws within INS implementation guidelines and philosophy and
not only warned INS but also cautioned the US Congress (during its
deliberations) that participation in the amnesty programme would suffer
if family unification provisions were not strengthened, documentation
requirements were not relaxed, and eligibility fees were not reduced.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL DATA ARIZONA
The dependent variable in this phase of the study is amnesty. The INS
had the responsibility for determining who would be eligible for temporary residency status- amnesty- based upon satisfactionof eligibility
guidelineskompletion of the application process. The dependent variable in surveys 1 and 2 was labelled “not completing application” and
“completing application” respectively. “Not completing application”
was coded “0” and “completing application” was coded “1”.
Fourteen independent variables were analysed to ascertain those factors
which may have limited, constrained, eliminated or promoted the opportunity for illegal aliens to acquire amnesty. These independent variables
were also dichotomies, assigned a value of one if checked as a reason for
difficulty in applying for amnesty and a value of zero if not checked. The
pertinent independent variables are money, residency, documents, family deportation, agency help, programme (understanding), lose welfare,
my reasons, farmer, paid in cash, fiom Mexico, sex, age and married.

Results
Table 1 (page 439) shows the standardized and unstandardized discriminant function coefficients. These coefficientswere used to obtain a
discriminant score for the function by multiplying each coefficientby its
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respective variable value and summing the products plus the constant.
The resultant score locates the individual case on a continuumrepresenting the function. Discriminant scores were computed for each individual
and then plotted as histograms shown in Figures 2,3 and 4 (pages 442
and 443), which shows the clustering of individual cases within the two
known groups.
Variables in the h c t i o n represent the concerns of QDEs and serve as
the foundation for eligibility guidelines established by INS. Table 1
indicates that variables “Paid in Cash”, being a “Farmer” and understanding the “Programme” were the most significant in discriminating
between the illegal groups. Of lesser, but still considerable significance
were the variables “My Reasons”, being able to show “Residency”,
“Age”, feeling the “Agency Could Help”, and being able to gather work
“Documents”. Further indication of their importance and rank is the
positive direction and the greater magnitude of their coefficients.
Residency is a significant variable with an impressive coefficient of
.26214.Proof of residency is dependent upon the ability of illegal aliens
to secure adequate documentationand, in this regard, these two variables
are interrelated with a coefficient of .52 .
The second most significantvariable was the requirement for excessive
documentation mandated by INS to apply for amnesty. Considering that
illegal aliens typically attempted to conceal their identity, they were now
being asked to reveal their true identity in order to acquire temporary
resident status and a work permit. Many had to rely on affidavitssecured
through a recent or previous employer. Many employers charged exorbitant fees, ranging from $25 to $500, for producing an affidavit
supporting resident requirements (Arp, 1989). Many documents were
fiaudulent which created an impossible situation for illegal aliens who
had to obtain affidavits fiom employers. The INS continuously warned
illegal workers not to use false documents. Detection by INS would
often result in penalties, including ineligibility to legalize, deportation,
fines and/or imprisonment. The fee requirement for legalization also
proved to be a significant variable regarding registration of illegal aliens.
It is well-documented that foreign workers are usually disadvantaged
and likely to be employed in low-level, poorly-paying jobs (Briggs,
1984; Marshall, 1982; North and Houstoun, 1976). This ability to pay
the required fee was always questionable. Applicants who feared the
deportation of relatives, loss of welfare benefits and were of the opinion
that agencies did not help, were less likely to complete the application
process than applicants who experienced no such difficulties (Arp,
1990). Illegal aliens who did not understand the programme represented
the third largest coefficient.
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Occupations and stability of employmentwere also major factors affecting the gathering of needed documentation. Thus, illegal residents
employed in the secondary labour market (service) therefore had a
greater opportunity to secure amnesty than did farm workers. In all
likelihood, instability and seasonality of an occupation were directly
related to the illegal alien’s abilityto secure proof of his or her residency.
The coefficient “paid in cash” reflects the large percentage of farm
workers who received payment in this way. The arrangement between
employer and employee benefited both: the employer made more profit
and did not have to fear the InternalRevenue Service;the illegal alien did
not have to prove identification which is required to cash a cheque.
Married applicantswere more likely to completethe application process
than non-married applicants and females were more likely to complete
the process than males. Table 1also shows that the younger the applicant,
the less likely he or she was to complete the application process.
Respondents to the survey 2 group, who worked primarily in the
secondary labour market, experienced fewer problems raising the required application fees than did farm workers. Stability of regular
employment(not included as a variable within this study)appearsto have
only provided the survey 2 group with the required fees and also provided
them with a more permanent residency than their counterpart. This
occupational factor serves indirectly to explain differences in the rate of
completion of the application process for legalization of their status.

ANALYSIS OF INDMDUAL DATA -NEW YORK
Amnesty is the dependent variable in this survey of sampled illegal
aliens who had completed the application process and received temporary residency status. The intent was to ascertain perceived barriers in
the application process for amnesty recipients (Table 2, page 440). They
also were asked why they thought others did not apply for the legalization programme (Table 3, page 440). The explanatory variables are fear
of INS, lack of documentation; fear of family separation; eligibility;
confusion caused by INS policy, high application costs, and New York‘s
informal economy.
Forty-six per cent of respondents in the New York study indicated that
they were afiaid of INS. While this cannot be regarded as a valid
explanation of why others did not apply, it does indicate widespread
concern about amnesty being used as a means of entrapment. Perhaps
this fear could have been lessened, but during the first six months, INS
in New York did not consistently mention the possibility of applying for
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amnesty through QDEs. Thus while “fear of the INS”per se cannot be
seen as a major deterrent, indirectly it may have caused potential
applicants to delay acquiring the necessary documentation.
The main concern among the New York group of amnesty recipients was
documentation; 59 per cent considered “having papers” was the key
determinant of their amnesty status. The second greatest perceived
barrier was confusion caused by INS implementation. According to
Coronado Communications (1987), 57 per cent admitted being very or
somewhat confused by INS directives.
Fear of family separation was mentioned by 47 per cent of respondents
as a concern, many having noted that they were the only family member
in the United States or that all other family members were legal. Not one
respondent mentioned fear of family separation as a reason why others
might not have applied. “Eligibility”, or what the Arizona study labelled
“Residency”, was a concern expressed by 44 per cent of New York’s
undocumented workers. High fees were also a relatively minor concern
and when asked why others did not apply, only 2 per cent thought that
money had been a barrier. The results of this survey confirm the findings
of North and Portz (1988)that too much complexity was associated with
eligibility requirements. Respondents did not cite fear of INS,concerns
about family separation or high costs as major factors.
The New York study examined a non-related INS variable as a potential
disincentive to apply. Researchers examining New York City’s low
application rate during the amnesty period hypothesized that because
large numbers of the city’s illegal alien population worked in ethnic
business enclaves, they felt safe and sheltered from the threat of employer sanctions and, therefore, had little incentive to apply (Meissner
and Papademetriou, 1988). Ninety-one per cent of applicants surveyed
disagreed with the use of employer sanctions to force their participation
in IRCA’s programme. The successhl amnesty applicants in New York
had a great deal in common with their counterparts in Arizona. The
variables, Documentation, ResidencyEligibility, and Lack of Understanding of the Programme/Confusion about the Programme indicate
that illegal residents fiom the East and West shared the same concerns
regarding INS implementation procedures.

CONCLUSIONS
We contended that implementation of a programme was a bureaucratic
fhction that duplicates and activates legislative intent. INS was chosen
by the US Congress to carry out the implementation of IRCA and its
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historical amnesty programme. Our structural analysis of INS procedures shows that INS symbolically opened its development of eligibility
procedures to community-basedLatino organizations, especiallyQDEs.
These organizations disagreed with the stringentrequirements proposed
by INS and advised the agency to require less documentation and proof
of residency. INS failed to consider their suggestions, although they
knew that illegal residents usually hid their true identities when residing
in the United States.
On the basis of results fiom the Arizona and New York studies, documentation was the key to amnesty, and INS understood the regulatory
effect of requiring extensive documentation. Under INS implementing
rules, without sufficient or proper documentation, residency could not
be established for upgrading the status of illegal residents. Proof required the submission of documents such as passports, rent receipts,
utility bills, birth or baptismal records, deeds, census records, police
records, bank books, school records, telephone receipts, insurance
records, drivers’ licences, social security cards, separation or divorce
decrees, and affidavits fiom past and present employers. Some who were
eligible for the programme did not apply because they could not produce
the necessary documentation.
Capacityto pay the required fees for processing applications was another
barrier placed in the path of illegal residents: $75.00 for basic counselling services and $25.00 for photography and fingerprintingassistance;
additional fees of $185.00 were set per application and a fee of $420 for
family applications. INS and its officials were aware of the inability of
many illegal persons to pay these fees.

Various Hispanic and religious groups, through letters, petitions, telephone calls, INS implementing conferences, and state officials and
lobbyists, informed INS of the impracticality of their proposed eligibility requirements. The suggestions of community-based organizations,
which would later become certifiedQDEs, were ignored or excluded and
were not reflected in substantive changes made by INS. An overall
assessment of QDE’s efforts to impact on implementation virtually
begins and ends with answers provided to INS’inquiries. Nondecisionmaking emerges as the primary factor defining INS implementation
procedures.
Instead of seeking a proper balance between the written words of IRCA
and the intent of Congress, INS developed guidelines that ignored the
relevant facts presented by respected QDEs and Latino groups. In
reality, the role of INS did not change very much. Instead of preventing
illegal entry along the Mexican border, INS sought to prevent illegal
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entry through amnesty ofices throughout the United States. The fear
generated by INS and confirmed by the Arizona and New York studies,
may be considered a natural reaction for an illegal population. The
number of illegal aliens who did not come forward as a result of INS’
long-standing enforcement image will never be known.
This study concludes that the eligibility requirements promulgated by
INS to regulate participation under the amnesty provisions of IRCA
served to limit and constrain participation in that programme and award
only those who were narrowly defined by implementing rules and
procedures. Future studies in this area should focus upon “policy design”
as a potential variable determining IRCA’s impact on the legislation of
undocumented residents in the United States.

REFERENCES
Arp,

w.III

1989

The Failure of IRCA to Achieve Its Goals: Legalization, Policy,
Process and Minority Participation, Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona
State University.
1990 “The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Differential
impacts on women?“, Social Injustice, 17(2): 23-39.
Bachrach, P., and M. S. Baratz
1962 Two Faces of Power, Oxford University Press, New York.
1970 Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, Oxford University Press,
New York.
Briggs, V. M.
1984 Immigration Policy and the American Labor Force, The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Carrasco, G.
1989 “The implementation of the American legalization experiment in
recent retrospect”, in L. Tomasi (Ed.), In Defense of the Alien,
Vol. X I , 1988 Proceedings, Center for Migration Studies, New
York.
Coronado Communications
1987 Qualified Designated Entities of the New York Metro Area,
Los Angeles (Also known as the Justice Group Study).
Dillin, J.
1990 “INS Commissioner’s plans to stop illegal aliens gets mixed reviews”, Christian Science Monitor, July 16: 1-2.
Di Nitto, D. M., and T. R. Dye
1987 Social Weyare:Politics andpublic and Public Policy, Prentice-Hall
Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

431

Edwards, G. C.
1980 Implementing Public Policy, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington D.C.
Frohock, F.
1979 Public Policy: Scope and Logic, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey.
Ingram, H. M., and D. E. Mann (Eds)
1980 WhyPolicies Succeed or Fail, Sage, Beverley Hills, California.
Marshall, R.
1982 Illegal Immigration: The Problem, the Solutions, Harper and Row,
New York.
Meissner, D., and D. Papademetriou
1988 The Legalization Countdown: A Third-Quarter Assessment,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
Nakamura, R. T., and F. Smallwood
1980 ThePolitics ofPolicy Implementation,St Martin’s Press, New York.
North, D. S., and M. F. Houstoun
1976 The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the US.Labour
Market: An Explanatory Study, Linton and Company, Washington.
North, D. S., and A. M. Portz
1988 Through the Maze: An Interim Report on the Alien Legalization
Program,Transcentury Development Associates, Washington, D.C.
Palumbo, D. J.
1988 Public Policy in America: Government in Action, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, San Diego.
1994 Public Policy in America: Government in Action, Harcourt Brace
and Company, San Diego.
Rein, M., and F. Rabinovitz
1978 Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective, Joint Centre for Urban
Studies, Cambridge.
Rhodes, C.
1986 “Amnesty for illegal aliens: The Australian experience”, Policy
Studies Review, 5(3).
Sharkansky, I.
1970 Public AdminisPation, Markham, Chicago.
The House Judiciary SubcommitteeReport
1971-2 94-506,92nd Congress, 1st and 2nd Session.

43 8

TABLE 1
DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
~

Variables

Unstandardized Func 1

Standardized

Money

.1 320420

.06445

Residency

5292510

.26214

Documents

A400682

.21969

Family/Depotl

.lo82425

.04662

Agency help

5758335

.22049

Programme

1.109596

.43226

Lose welfare

.5444793

.21220

My reasons

.7757887

.35697

Farmer

.9946559

.45774

Paid in cash

1.467183

.59966

From Mexico

.0199669

,00594

Sex

.0495274

.02309

Age

.0271612

.24158

Are you married

3344953

,16286

CANONICAL DISCRIMANANT FUNCTIONS
Eigenvalue

Pct of
variance

Cum
Pct

Canonical' After
Corr *"Lambda

9.3571

100.00

100.00

,7588

439

.4242

Wilks'
Chisquare

DF

Sig

388.273

14

.oooO

1.

Were you afraid of letting
the INS know you are
here?

2.

Were you worried about
not having proof of
residency?

7.

I

8.

Very

Somewhat

66

13

(46%)

Not
92

(54%)

68

(40%)

DWNA

1Yo

Were you worried about
family separation?

77

3

(47%)

91

(53%)

Were you worried about
being eligible?

57

18

(44%)

96

(56%)

Were you worried about
knowing how to apply?

69

15

(49%)

87

(51%)

Were you confused by
INS handling of the
programme?

82

16

(57%)

72

(42%)

1Yo

Were you worried about
not having the money to
apply?
Do you agree with the
statement, “It is easy to
live in New York City
without being discovered
so why apply.”

66

9

(44%)

95

(55%)

1Yo

6

9

(9%)

156

(91%)

1) Responses of “Very” and “Somewhat” are summed to produce stated percentages.
2) DK = Don’t know
NA = Not applicable

TABLE 3
WHY ILLEGALS DID NOT APPLY FOR AMNESTY
Reasons

Number of Responses

1. Fear of INS

97

2. Lack of documentation

22

3. Not eligible

18

4. Apathy

10

5. Too confusing

7

6. Lack of money

3

7. Don’t know

14

Opinions of illegal residents now approved for amnesty - New York City Survey.
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FIGURE 1

Stuart in The Cristian Science Monitor 0 1990 TCSPS
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FIGURE 2
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: Histogram for Group 1 Survey I
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FIGURE 3
DISCRIMINANTANALYSIS: Histogram for Group 2 Survey II
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FIGURE 4
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS: Allgroups stacked Histogram
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Actual
Group

No. of
Cases

Predicted Group
1

Group Membership
2

Group 1
Survey I

226

190
84.1%

15.9%

Group 2
Survey II

230

21
9.1%

209
90.9%

36

Per cent of "grouped"cases correctly classified:87.50%.
ClassificationProcessing Summary
594 caseswereprocessed.
0 cases were excluded for missing or out-of range group codes.
138 cases had at least one missing discriminating variable.
456 cases were used for printedoutput.
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MISE EN OEUVRE DES MESURES VOULUES
PAR LE CONGRES DES ETATS-UNIS : UNE ETUDE
DE LA POLITIQUE D’AMNISTIE ET DES SERVICES
D’IMMIGRATION ET DE NATURALISATION
La Loi de 1986 sur la rdforme et la rtgulation de l’immigration (Immigration Reform and Control Act - IRCA) prdsente deux aspects:
l’amnistie et les sanctions A l’dgard des employeurs. Cette loi doit
permettre d’avoir sous contrdle la population des immigrants clandestins aux Etats-Unis et d’en fieiner l’accroissement. L’article
examine, A travers l’analyse de donntes recueillies pour 1’Arizona et
New York, le r61e de 1’INS dans la mise en oeuvre du volet amnistie de
1’IRCA. I1 ddmontre que le Service d’immigration et de naturalisation,
qui a pourtant supervisd le plus vaste programme d’amnistie de
l’histoire, a, par son interprdtation restrictive des intentions du Congres
amdricain, exclu ou limitt la possibilitt pour les btndficiaires de
solliciter et d’obtenir un droit de rdsidence permanent.

PUESTA EN PRACTICA DE UN INTENT0 DEL CONGRESO:
UN ESTLJDIO SOBRE LA POLITICA DE AMNISTIA
Y EL SERVICIO DE INMIGRACION Y NATURALIZACION
La Ley de Reforma y Control de la Inmigraci6n de 1986 (IRCA)
comprendia dos caracteristicas claves: la amnistia y las sanciones a 10s
empleadores. Esta Ley tenia por objeto controlar y fienar el increment0
de la poblaci6n indocumentada en 10s Estados Unidos. En este articulo
se examina el papel que desempeiia el Servicio de Inmigraci6n y
Naturalizaci6n en la puesta en prhctica del aspect0 relacionado con la
amnistia en la Ley de Reforma y Control de la Inmigracih gracias a
datos compilados y examinados procedentes de Arizona y Nueva York.
Los resultados demuestran que si bien el Servicio de Inmigracih y
Naturalizacibnha previsto el mayor programa de amnistia de su historia,
su interpretacibn restrictiva del intento del Congreso de 10s Estados
Unidos prescribe y limita a 10s beneficiarios que podrian solicitar y
adquirir la residencia permanente.
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